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Essay
“It’s Not You, It’s Me”: Assessing an Emerging
Relationship Between Law and Social Science
TRISTIN K. GREEN
This Essay isolates and assesses an overlooked consideration on an
emerging and significant issue in employment discrimination law. The
emerging issue: When should employers be held liable for established
widespread differential treatment within their organizations?
The
overlooked consideration: the relationship between law and social science.
Although this Essay focuses closely on a specific doctrinal issue in
employment discrimination law, it also sets broad theoretical groundwork
for thinking about the implications of the relationships that might emerge
between law and social science in a variety of legal realms.
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“It’s Not You, It’s Me”:1 Assessing an Emerging
Relationship Between Law and Social Science
TRISTIN K. GREEN∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A lot of ink has been spilled over the past few years in the realm of
employment discrimination law over plaintiffs’ use of social science expert
testimony regarding whether a specific employment decision was—or
specific decisions were—the product of stereotyped or otherwise biased
thinking.2 This is not the only place, however, where a relationship
between employment discrimination law and social science is likely to
develop. Indeed, such a relationship has already begun to emerge at a
second doctrinal point, with almost no thought paid to how the relationship
should best be structured.
This new relationship between employment discrimination law and
social science emerges as courts and legal scholars struggle to set limits on
employer responsibility under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act3 for
disparities that result from low-level decision makers’ widespread reliance
on stereotypes and other biases. Recent cases, like the well-known Wal-

1
Seinfeld (NBC television broadcast Oct. 28, 1993) (quoting George Constanza’s famous breakup line).
∗
Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. Thanks to Rachel ArnowRichman, Joshua Davis, Michelle Travis, and Noah Zatz for valuable feedback on drafts and also the
panelists and participants in the Employment Discrimination Section Panel at the 2013 Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting, where I presented an early version of this Essay.
2
This debate has been ongoing in both the individual discrimination realm and the systemic
discrimination realm. See, e.g., Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549 (2011) (highlighting Dr.
William Bielby’s testimony in a systemic discrimination context); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (discussing Dr. Susan Fiske’s testimony in an individual discrimination context).
Legal and social science scholars have produced a thoughtful spectrum of commentary in the course of
this debate. See Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89, 92 (1990) (discussing the impact of Dr. Fiske’s testimony and the possible
benefits of similar testimony in future cases); Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context:
Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37,
39–40 (2009) (arguing for admissibility of social science testimony like that of Dr. Bielby in Wal-Mart
v. Dukes); John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of
“Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1715–16 (2008) (challenging the admissibility of some
social science testimony, including that of Dr. Bielby in Wal-Mart v. Dukes). See generally Wal-Mart:
Social Science Methods in Class Actions, 40 SOC. METHODS RES. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2011) (presenting a
collection of scholarly works related to sociology and its impact on Wal-Mart v. Dukes).
3
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
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4

Mart v. Dukes, have involved allegations that the defendants’
organizational structures, cultures, and policies—including but not limited
to the practice of leaving decisions to the subjective discretion of
managers—provide a certain context within which stereotyped decisions
proliferate, resulting in differential treatment of women or racial minorities
in pay, promotion, work assignments, discharge, etc.5 These cases involve
the usual questions about whether and when discrimination is widespread
within an organization, but they also raise questions about whether and
when an organization should be held liable for established widespread
differential treatment within its walls.6
The shape of the law determines its relationship with social science. In
this Essay, I focus on how choices about the law are likely to affect the
law’s relationship with social science at this second doctrinal point: the
question of employer responsibility once widespread differential treatment
has been established. This question is on the cusp of judicial development,
as I will show; yet it has seen almost no attention in the legal scholarship.
Using specific examples, I identify three broad types of law-social science
relationships that might emerge at this doctrinal point. I draw out the law’s
expectations in each of these relationships for social science, and I assess
some of the practical implications of the relationship types and the law’s
expectations of social science within those relationships.
In addition to this practical goal7 situated very much within
employment discrimination law, I also have a more broadly theoretical
objective for this Essay: to use and improve upon the existing taxonomy or
conceptual language for thinking about the relationship between law and
4

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
Id. at 2547; see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 545 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(certifying and defining female plaintiff classes).
6
The issue has been raised and phrased in various ways. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553
(suggesting a requirement that top-level decision makers must have adopted a “policy” of
discrimination); Oral Argument at 40:00, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_10_277 (Kennedy, J.) (raising the possibility of a
“deliberate indifference” inquiry); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Good and Evil in Civil Rights
Law: The Case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 513, 528 (2011) (“The
employer as an entity is vicariously liable for any and all discriminatory employment decisions and
statistical proof of a pattern of discriminatory decisions can be sufficient, provided the statistical proof
is compelling. However, a showing that an employer has made a conscientious effort to prevent
discrimination might serve as an affirmative defense to liability.”); see also Melissa Hart, The
Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623,
1623 (2007) (stating that an employer should not be liable under Title VII for widespread differential
treatment if it “made substantial compliance efforts, even if those efforts have not eliminated
inequalities”); Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 119, 122 (2012) (arguing in favor of a negligence standard to determine employer liability
for widespread differential treatment within organizations).
7
Although I do provide some preliminary cautions about the risks of the various types of
relationships, my aim here is to enrich inquiry into the proper shape of the law in this area rather than to
advance one relationship or approach over another.
5
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social science. I refer throughout the Essay to the now well-established
categories describing the ways that social science is used by law—as social
fact, social framework, and social authority8—and I develop a variation to
the categories that has not yet been examined: a variation of
embeddedness.
When social science is used as social fact, it is used as evidence that
directly engages disputes and factual issues specific to the parties in a
lawsuit.9 The use of empirical research to determine consumer confusion
in trademark cases is a classic example of social science being used as
social fact.10 The social scientist discerns facts relevant to the case firsthand (in this situation, creating a survey using the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s marks) and undertakes professional analysis of those facts to
aid the fact finder in determining whether confusion between the two
marks is likely.11
Social science is used as social framework when it is presented as
background or context within which to determine facts in a specific
dispute.12 Social science testimony is often presented as social framework
in employment discrimination cases on the question mentioned at the
outset: whether a decision or decisions within an organization were sex or
race based. The social scientist testifies in these cases as to the body of
research on stereotyping and operation of biases and the conditions under
which those biases and stereotypes are likely to influence employment
decisions.13 The fact finder relies on the testimony in these cases only as
background knowledge about how and under what conditions stereotypes
8
John Monahan and Laurens Walker are credited with coining these terms and developing theory
around how courts should assess social science when it is used by law in these different ways. See
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Establishing Social
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan & Walker, Social Authority]
(describing social fact and social authority); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A
New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan,
Social Frameworks] (advancing the concept of social science used as social framework). Monahan and
Walker built upon the early work of Kenneth Culp Davis, who distinguished adjudicative and
legislative facts—with adjudicative facts bearing on immediate cases and parties and legislative facts
being generalized facts about the world that usually bear on courts’ choices about law and policy.
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in Administrative Procedures, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364, 402 (1942).
9
See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Twenty Five Years of Social Science in Law, 35 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 72, 75 (2011) [hereinafter Monahan & Walker, Twenty Five Years] (noting that social
science research has long aided in resolving factual disputes in courtrooms).
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 373 (D.N.J. 2002)
(detailing the efforts of expert witnesses in conducting studies of confusion of ophthalmologists and
optometrists over names “Travatan” and “Xalatan” for medication used to treat glaucoma).
12
Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 8, at 559.
13
Commentators vigorously dispute whether social scientists who have testified for plaintiffs in
cases like Wal-Mart crossed the line between social framework and social fact without adequate study.
See sources cited supra note 2. This Essay does not enter that debate.
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and biases are likely to operate and result in differential treatment. The
fact finder must still infer from other evidence that a decision was or
decisions were more likely than not based on race or sex. Such evidence
can include conditions specific to the organization and statistical analysis
showing unaccounted-for, statistically significant disparities in a systemic
discrimination case or comparative evidence and statements reflecting bias
on the part of an identified decision maker in a case involving
discrimination against a single individual.
Social science is used as social authority when it is relied on in the
creation of legal rules of broad applicability.14 The Supreme Court’s
famous reliance on the doll studies in Brown v. Board of Education15 to
declare separate schools unconstitutional is a classic example of social
science being used as social authority.16 There are many other such
examples.17 Indeed, the movement of behavioral realism pushes us to
realize how often legal frameworks and specific judicial decisions,
particularly in the area of employment discrimination law, rest on theories
about the nature of the real-world phenomena of human behavior: “what
discrimination is, what causes it to occur, how it can be prevented, and how
its presence or absence can best be discerned in particular cases . . . .”18
These categories of social fact, social framework, and social authority
have been used primarily for guiding the understanding of how courts and
other legal bodies, such as administrative entities or legislatures, should
treat social science testimony submitted to them, and whether they should
seek out additional social science research or testimony. Social science
testimony submitted to a court as a social fact, for example, is typically
evaluated under the Federal Rules of Evidence and is limited to that which
is submitted by the parties. Conversely, it has been argued that social
science testimony submitted to a court or legislative or executive body as
social authority should be treated much more loosely. It might be treated
by courts, for example, under a standard of legal precedent and by
legislative and administrative bodies under principles of thorough and
careful consideration, warranting independent gathering of relevant social
science research on the part of both legislatures and administrative
agencies.19
14

Monahan & Walker, Twenty-Five Years, supra note 9, at 76.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16
Id. at 494 n.11.
17
See Monahan & Walker, Twenty-Five Years, supra note 9, at 76 (noting the role of social
science research in school district racial balancing, Title IX, and death penalty litigation).
18
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2006).
19
Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 8, at 488. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999) (describing the use of science
in different legal contexts).
15
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In this Essay, I urge the use of these same categories for situating and
understanding the law’s expectations for social science on specific
doctrinal issues and its long-term relationship with social science.
Moreover, in addition to relying on the foundational categories (social fact,
social framework, and social authority), I develop a variation of the
categories that more thickly describes the relationship between law and
social science in some circumstances—a variation of embeddedness. I
argue that social science can become embedded in law either as social fact
or social authority, and that when social science becomes embedded in law,
the relationship between the two becomes more intimate. Law and social
science (rather than social science and the individuals or entities being
regulated) must interact on a more regular basis than when social science is
not embedded in law.20 Social science is embedded in law as social fact
when social science testimony is required by law (and not merely regularly
or occasionally relied upon by parties) to make a legally acceptable factual
finding in each case. It is embedded in law as social authority when it is
used to formulate specific social science-based directives for regulated
individuals or entities.21
Using these categories (and developing more fully the variation of
embeddedness) in the material that follows, I identify three relationship
types that might emerge between law and social science at the doctrinal
point of employer liability once widespread differential treatment within a
defendant organization has been established. I then draw out the
expectations for social science that exist in each relationship and present
some practical implications and cautions.
II. RELATIONSHIP #1: WILL YOU MARRY ME (BE MY LIFE PARTNER)?
A. Describing the Relationship
One type of relationship that might emerge between systemic
discrimination law and social science on the issue of employer
responsibility is one of absolute reliance. In this relationship, the law
requires social science testimony for factual findings in each case. Social
20
The term “embedded” is sometimes used to describe the law’s reliance on social science
generally. See, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 18, at 999 (“Behavioral theories can thus enter and
remain embedded in legal doctrine long after they have been disconfirmed or superseded by advances
in the empirical social sciences.”). Used in this sense, social science is always embedded in law, at
least in laws that rely on beliefs about human behavior. I seek to develop the term more specifically in
this Essay to describe relationships with a high degree of intimacy between law and social science.
21
For reasons that should become clear, embeddedness describes an intimacy between law and
social science that is unlikely to develop when social science is used only as social framework, even
when it is presented regularly in legal cases. This said, when social framework is used regularly (and
in large, high-profile class actions), similar concerns as those that center around embeddedness might
surface.
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science, in other words, is embedded in law as social fact.
Social science embedded as social fact is different from other uses of
social science testimony for determining facts, such as the survey
measuring confusion in a trademark case.22 If social science is not
embedded in law, then a fact finder may make a legally acceptable finding
without social science testimony. It may find, for example, likely
confusion between two marks based on evidence of actual confusion (e.g.,
consumers testifying that they were confused) even if no social scientist
conducts a survey with results that indicate likely confusion. When the law
embeds social science as social fact, in contrast, it marries legal outcome to
social science in every case. Some courts have held that a plaintiff’s
failure to present social science testimony based on a conducted survey
using the marks at issue in a trademark case “counts against” a finding of
confusion.23 To the extent these courts have begun to require social
science in order for plaintiffs to succeed in proving likely confusion, the
courts have begun to embed social science as social fact.
The requirement under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that
employment tests with a disparate impact on a protected group be
professionally validated24 is another example of social science becoming
embedded in law as social fact. Sociologist Robin Stryker and her
colleagues show in a recent article in the Journal of Law and Social
Inquiry that the Supreme Court came to embed social science as social fact
in the area of testing and disparate impact by requiring situational
specificity—that each test with a disparate impact be validated for the
specific job, employer, and population for which it is used.25
When the Civil Rights Act passed in 1964, section 703(h) protected
employers from liability for the administration and use of “professionally
developed ability test[s].”26 Teaming up with industrial psychologists in
22

See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Merriam Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The
lack of survey evidence counts against finding actual confusion.”). See generally Sandra Edelman,
Failure to Conduct a Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90
TRADEMARK REP. 746, 746–47 (2000) (discussing the appropriateness of attaching significance to the
absence of survey evidence regarding confusion in trademark infringement cases).
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006) (providing that it is not unlawful “for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin”).
25
Robin Stryker et al., Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology: Social
Science as Social Authority and the Co-Production of Law and Science, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 777,
791–92 (2012).
26
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 257. The relevant provision
now states: “[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test . . . is not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (2006).
23
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1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued
guidelines stating that a test does not automatically qualify as
“professionally developed” under section 703(h) simply because it was
designed by someone “claiming expertise in test preparation.”27 Rather,
the EEOC interpreted the provision to mean “a test which fairly measures
the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which
the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to
measure the applicant’s ability to perform a particular job or class of
jobs.”28 When the Supreme Court embraced disparate impact theory in
Griggs v. Duke Power29 in 1971, it also embraced the idea that
professionally developed tests must be validated.30 In a later case,
Albemarle v. Moody,31 as Stryker shows, the Court cemented its
commitment to situational specificity and differential validity,32 thereby
embedding the use of social science as social fact in disparate impact cases
involving professionally developed tests.33
On the relationship emerging at the doctrinal point of employer
responsibility for widespread differential treatment, the law might similarly
embed social science as social fact through disparate impact law. Several
courts have recently certified classes in cases much like Wal-Mart v. Dukes
using disparate impact law. In McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,34 for
example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of class
certification.35 The plaintiffs in the case alleged that identified disparities
in pay between white and black brokers at Merrill Lynch resulted from
differential treatment exercised through discretionary decisions made by
brokers at the many Merrill Lynch offices.36 Specifically, they alleged that
27
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES 2
(1966) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDELINES]; see also Stryker et al., supra note 25, at 787–88 (discussing
the EEOC guidelines).
28
EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at 2.
29
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
30
Stryker et al., supra note 25, at 785; see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (“What Congress has
forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance.”).
31
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
32
Stryker et al., supra note 25, at 791 (“The Court did not invoke the scientific term situational
specificity, but the company’s failure to adhere to this idea drove Court concern that the test score
entry-level job relationship was not validated. . . . The Supreme Court invoked the Guidelines’
differential validation requirement for minorities when technically feasible . . . .”).
33
Stryker and colleagues also argue that over time the industrial psychology field came to
embrace a revolution toward “validity generalization” (the idea that the results of validity studies can
be generalized to many jobs not actually studied), thus largely rejecting the requirement of situational
specificity and to a lesser extent also differential validity. Id. at 797–98. The case law, however, still
requires situational specificity and differential validity. See id. at 800 (discussing EEOC v. Atlas Paper
Co., 868 F.2d 1487 (6th Cir. 1989)).
34
672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).
35
Id. at 492.
36
Id. at 488.
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stereotypes and biases exercised by white brokers restricted black brokers’
access to lucrative teams and reduced black brokers’ receipt of accounts
distributed when brokers left the firm.37 Judge Posner, writing for the
panel, isolated two elements of Merrill Lynch’s employment practices for
disparate impact review: (1) the company’s teaming policy (a policy of
allowing brokers to form their own teams); and (2) its account distribution
policy (a policy of distributing accounts in a way that rewarded the most
successful teams).38
To understand how proceeding in a case like Merrill Lynch under
disparate impact law might embed social science as social fact requires a
brief review of disparate impact law doctrine. Under disparate impact law,
an employer is liable if it uses a practice that has a disparate impact,39
unless the employer can show that its use of the practice is “job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”40 If the
employer meets its burden on this defense, the plaintiffs can still succeed if
they can point to an alternative employment practice that does not have the
same impact and that the employer has refused to adopt.41
A case like Merrill Lynch—or Wal-Mart, for that matter—throws into
sharp relief the interaction between the employer’s defense to disparate
impact, that the use is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity, and the plaintiffs’ opportunity to nonetheless
succeed if they can point to an alternative employment practice that has a
lesser impact. We can really only know, after all, if an employer’s reliance
on subjectivity, whether exercised by brokers in selecting team members or
by managers in making pay and promotion decisions, is legally permissible
by looking at the use of that practice in the particular context in which it is
being used, including the decision-making system as a whole and the
workplace culture in which the practice is being carried out. The question,
in other words, is not whether a practice in isolation (e.g., allowing
subjectivity or teams) is job related and consistent with business necessity.
Instead, the question comes down to whether the employer has instituted
sufficient safeguards against differential treatment as part of its use of the
practice.
The law might frame this question as the employer’s defense or as the
plaintiffs’ opportunity to point to an alternative practice (and where the law
places the inquiry will affect which party bears the burden of production
37

Id. at 488–89.
Id.
39
The EEOC Guidelines adopt a “four-fifths rule” under which a selection rate for any protected
group that is less than four-fifths (80%) of the rate of the group with the highest rate will generally be
regarded as evidence of disparate impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2012).
40
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
41
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
38

2013]

“IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S ME”

297

and proof). Either way, we can begin to see that social science will
become embedded in law as social fact because in order to make a
reasoned decision, a judge is likely to need social science testimony in each
case concerning this employer’s use of the practice in this workplace
context. The expert would testify after examining the entirety of the
organization’s relevant practices, systems, and cultures in light of existing
research as to what more the organization could do to reduce bias in its
employment decisions.42 The final normative or legal question, of course,
would remain for the court: If more can be done, then is the cost of doing
more too much such that use of the existing practice “as is” is permissible,
even given a disparate impact, or is the employer required to alter its use of
the practice (or the context in which the practice is being used)? Without
social science testimony as an initial matter, however, it is difficult to see
how a court could reliably discern the alternatives from which to make the
final legal determination of permissibility/liability.43
B. Expectations and Implications
The law in this relationship expects social scientists to be able to
discern from a specific study of an organization’s practices, in light of
existing research, what the organization could do to reduce biases in its
employment decisions. This expectation itself seems realistic, given recent
42
We would also expect evidence to be presented on the potential cost to the employer of
implementing bias-reducing mechanisms, although that evidence may take various forms and is not
likely to be within the realm of social science testimony, unless the cost is framed as one of human
behavior.
43
Courts have struggled to make sense of how subjectivity in personnel decision-making systems
could be evaluated under disparate impact law, particularly when focusing narrowly on the job-relatedand-consistent-with-business-necessity defense. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 991–98 (1988) (O’Connor, J., plurality) (expressing concern about applying a strict
validation requirement to the use of subjective decision-making practices and arguing in favor of a
relaxed standard of job relatedness and shift of the burden of persuasion on the issue to the plaintiff);
see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (adopting the approach
suggested by Justice O’Connor in Watson), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 227 (2005). This is
not surprising. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1232 (1995)
(“Validating subjective decisionmaking systems in accordance with professionally acceptable standards
is neither empirically nor economically feasible, especially for jobs where intangible qualities, such as
interpersonal skills, creativity, and the ability to make sound judgments under conditions of
uncertainty, are critical.”). But the use of subjectivity need not be viewed so narrowly. Indeed,
subjectivity is similar to many other employment practices that are problematic in implementation more
than in isolation. See, e.g., Erin L. Kelly & Alexandra Kalev, Managing Flexible Work Arrangements
in U.S. Organizations: Formalized Discretion or ‘A Right to Ask,’ 4 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 379, 408
(2006) (finding that “[f]ormalized discretion” in implementation of flexible work arrangements
explained low use and unequal access); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 362–63 (2003) (describing some of the challenges in implementing
telecommunication for women in specific workplaces).
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advancements in scientific understanding of how biases operate under
various conditions and of the mechanisms and contexts that tend to reduce
differential outcomes.44
There are, however, several implications of the embedded nature of
this relationship of which we should be aware. First, just as when
industrial organizational psychology was embedded as social fact in the
area of tests and disparate impact law, bringing social scientists
consistently into litigation as this relationship does will likely drive a
particular market for social science that ultimately shapes social science at
the same time that social science shapes the law and factual findings within
In their study of the relationship between industrial
the law.45
organizational psychology and disparate impact law in the area of tests,
Stryker and her colleagues explain that “[o]nce I-O psychology routinely
helped resolve questions of legal liability, legal issues likewise shaped
scientific questions and research.”46 The fact that many social scientists
continued to embrace situational specificity (which is required by disparate
impact law), even after scientific evidence built in favor of validity
generalization, serves as an example of this form of “co-production.”47
Second, embedding social science as social fact is likely to stir the
already heated pot of controversy and debate in the social science and legal
communities surrounding the validity of the methods used by social
scientists in the context of litigation.48 This, again, is because courts will
need to decide in each case whether the particular studies offered are
admissible in court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.49 Although
debate and controversy may not be sufficient reasons to shy away from a
particular legal approach, the difficulty and cost entailed in developing
agreed upon methods seem worthy of consideration.
44
See, e.g., Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 602–09 (2006) (assessing
the impact of various diversity measures on promotion into management); Soohan Kim et al.,
Progressive Corporations at Work: The Case of Diversity Programs, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 171, 174–75 (2012) (detailing longitudinal studies showing success and lack of success of
several common diversity measures within adopting organizations); Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate
Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 320–21 (2000) (emphasizing
contextual influences on biases and relations); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender
System and Interaction, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 191, 211 (1999) (finding that in contexts where men and
women have unequal power, male-female interactions show gender-based behavioral differences).
45
See Stryker et al., supra note 25, at 803 (“[O]nce social science routinely is used to help resolve
questions of legal liability, scientific issues become legal issues and vice versa. Illustrated by
psychologists’ enthusiastic pursuit of differential validation research, law henceforth shapes scientific
commitments and research agendas.”).
46
Id. at 791.
47
See id. at 797 (“Some who staked careers on situational specificity, or trained when it was
consensual, maintained its truth until they died.”).
48
See sources cited supra note 2.
49
See FED. R. EVID. 702 (governing admission of testimony by expert witnesses).
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III. RELATIONSHIP # 2: LET’S DANCE
A. Describing the Relationship
Another possibility is that law and social science will dance—that the
law will ask, either (1) by embedding social science in legal rulemaking as
social authority or (2) by inviting social science as social framework, that
social science generally (rather than specifically) inform judicial decisions
about employer responsibility. One way to think of the relationship in the
former category is as a dance in which the social science leads, and the
relationship in the latter category as a dance in which the law leads.50
1. You Lead
The law can use social science as social authority in a variety of ways.
The most well known is when a legislature or a court relies on social
science to make a broad legal ruling, like the Court’s reliance on the doll
studies in Brown v. Board of Education.51 Empirical grounding for broad
legal pronouncements like the one in Brown creates a longstanding
relationship between law and social science such that the law should be
modified if and when the grounding ever becomes sufficiently displaced.
Nonetheless, the relationship between law and social science in this
circumstance is relatively settled and smooth, and even to some degree
hands-off.52
When the law embeds social science as social authority (in contrast to
merely using it as social authority), it creates a more intimate relationship
with social science, something more akin to a dance. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court ultimately embedded social science as social fact in
Griggs and Albemarle when it required specific validation of tests to meet
the section 703(h) defense.53 The current EEOC guidelines on test
50
By “dance” I do not mean the side-by-side hopping that one might see at middle school dances
today, but more of a ballroom dance in which one partner leads the other in coordinated step.
51
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. I put using social science as grounding for a
legal framework like the tripartite framework created in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–07 (1973), or existing systemic disparate treatment theory in this category. See also Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Behavioral Realism in Law: Reframing the Discussion About Social Science’s Place
in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 383, 386–95 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008) (pointing out many ways in
which behavioral theories and beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination and how it operates
inform the law).
52
See Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 8, at 478 (“[P]roblems [with the use of
social science] stem largely from an early and unfortunate determination that social science materials
should be treated as ‘facts,’ even when used to formulate a rule of law.”); see also Krieger, supra note
51, at 395 (arguing for greater use of social science in amicus briefs to inform judicial decisions about
the law).
53
See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (describing EEOC guidelines regarding
validation).
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validation, however, actually provide an example of embedded social
authority.
Here, the law (the EEOC guidelines) states that “[n]ew
strategies for showing the validity of selection procedures will be evaluated
as they become accepted by the psychological profession.”54 The
guidelines ask social science to define specific legal directives that will tell
employers what they must do in order to avoid liability. Here, law and
social science begin to dance.55
On the issue of employer responsibility for widespread differential
treatment, the dance is likely to be even more intimate. Several scholars
have proposed a “best practices” defense to employer liability for
widespread differential treatment.56 For instance, Professor Richard
Thompson Ford states in a recent article that “a conscientious effort to
prevent discrimination might serve as an affirmative defense to liability.”57
To raise this defense, he continues, “the employer, at a minimum, should
be required to show that it followed the best practices in the industry to
correct the vulnerability of its employment procedures to sexism.”58
It is possible that Ford and others who make similar suggestions
envision best practices as practices that emerge from the industry—that is,
from the organizations being regulated—rather than from social science
directly. This would be odd in the context of employment discrimination,
however, where the practices are not being used to settle on common
standards of behavior but rather to advance an end-goal of nondiscrimination. Research by sociologist Alexandra Kalev and her
colleagues shows quite starkly how dangerous accepting industry standards
would be for equality goals.59 This research reveals that many of the
measures adopted by organizations in response to employment
discrimination laws and the rise of diversity management have been
54
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (2012). The
guidelines also state that the provisions for validating tests:

[A]re intended to be consistent with generally accepted professional standards for
evaluating standardized tests and other selection procedures, such as those described
in the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests prepared by a joint
committee of the American Psychological Association, the American Educational
Research Association, and the National Council on Measurement in Education . . .
and standard textbooks and journals in the field of personnel selection.
Id. § 1607.5(C).
55
Indeed, the law responded to changes in professional standards with the New Uniform
Guidelines promulgated in 2007. For a very brief review of the history behind the latest guidelines, see
MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 279 (7th ed.
2008).
56
E.g., Ford, supra note 6, at 528; Hart, supra note 6, at 1647–48.
57
Ford, supra note 6, at 528.
58
Id.
59
See generally Kalev et al., supra note 44 (examining the effects of commonly adopted diversity
programs).
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ineffective, even harmful to the success of women and minorities at work.60
Assuming that what Ford and others mean is best practices as
identified by social science, then the law would be framed to embed social
science as social authority. The law would rely on social science to
develop specific directives for employers. The EEOC in this scenario
might, for example, issue guidelines that lay out specific practices and state
that if an employer follows these specified practices—e.g., “these five
delineated mechanisms for reducing differential treatment”—then it will
not be held liable, even if biases and stereotyping continue to result in
substantial pay and promotion disparities within the employer’s work
organization. This is a dance between law and social science, with the
social science taking the lead.
2. I Lead
Another option for the dance is that the law leads. Here, the law is
framed much more loosely. As Ford might put it, employers would have to
make a “conscientious effort.”61 Or, as Professor Melissa Hart has argued,
employers might avoid liability if they can show that they “made
substantial compliance efforts.”62 Social science naturally informs the law
on what conscientious compliance efforts might look like, but the law (or
more precisely the courts, deciding on a case by case basis) would hold the
final word in each case under this scenario. Social science here is not
embedded in the law, but it is invited as social framework to inform the
court or other fact finder as to what organizations might do to reduce
discrimination within their employment systems and work environments.
B. Expectations and Implications
In the “Let’s Dance” relationship, whether “You Lead” or “I Lead,” the
law expects that social science can provide generalized recommendations
that will reduce or are likely to reduce differential workplace treatment
across organizations and industries. Unlike with the defendant-specific
findings expected in the marriage-like relationship, research suggests that
this expectation of generalizable recommendations might be unrealistic.
The literature on bias and organizational behavior suggests that it will be
difficult for social scientists to identify mechanisms for reducing
differential treatment that are not inextricably intertwined with particular
organizational context, including workplace culture, and are not dependent

60

Id.
Ford, supra note 6, at 528.
62
Hart, supra note 6, at 1623. Others have proposed a negligence standard, which would be a
variation on this approach. E.g., Weiss, supra note 6, at 122.
61
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on effective implementation by each organization.
Moreover, particularly with the latter scenario, there is the related
problem of judicial deference to organizations that sociologist Lauren
Edelman and others have uncovered in their work.64 This research shows
that in conditions where the law is amorphous and social science inexact
(precisely the “Let’s Dance, I Lead” relationship), courts are more likely to
defer to organizations without meaningful review of the efficacy of the
organizational practices being adopted.65
IV. RELATIONSHIP #3: LET’S JUST BE FRIENDS
A. Describing the Relationship
In this last type of relationship, the law is framed to trigger reliance by
others on social science, without intimate ongoing involvement between
law and social science, whether in the form of specific legal findings or
legal pronouncements of generally applicable directives or rules. The law
and social science here are simply friends. They are aware of, indeed may
even rely upon, each other, but without regular interaction or exchange
between the two.
One variation of this type of relationship involves using outcome
standards or benchmarks as signals of wrongdoing, though in some cases
those benchmarks are set by the organizations being regulated. Rather than
telling regulated entities exactly what to do, this approach sets standards
for regulated entities to meet and lets the entities figure out how best to
meet those standards.66 Environmental regulation in the past decade has
sometimes taken this approach.67
A more intimate, but still not embedded variation involves processbased requirements established by law, usually through administrative
bodies acting in tandem with stakeholders. This approach has risen to the
forefront in various ways in environmental law and, more recently, in the
63
See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 44, at 211 (pointing to de-coupling as a reason for poor
outcomes from some diversity measures and to directly engaging managers as a way of minimizing decoupling). See generally sources cited supra note 44 (emphasizing the influence of context on bias and
successful implementation of diversity measures).
64
See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888 (2011).
65
Id.
66
See Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in
Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 709 (2003) (“In contrast to a
design standard or a technology-based standard that specifies exactly how to achieve compliance, a
performance standard sets a goal and lets each regulated entity decide how to meet it.”). This approach
is sometimes called performance-based regulation. Id.
67
See Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the New
Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2001) (describing several approaches within environmental law,
including emissions trading, that look to outcomes over means of obtaining outcomes).
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area of risk management in the financial services industry.
In the
employment realm, Executive Order 11,246 requires government
contractors and recipients of federal funds to undertake affirmative action
by developing a plan to increase equality within their organizations;69 this
might fall within this latter, more process-based category.
How might the law establish a “Just Friends” relationship at the
doctrinal point of employer responsibility for widespread differential
treatment? One reading of systemic disparate treatment law would do this.
For example, a legal finding that differential treatment is widespread
within an organization—based on statistical analyses of pay and promotion
data and any other evidence (including social science) tending to show that
observed disparities are not likely due to legitimate factors or to chance—
would trigger employer liability.70 Period. It would be up to the employer
under this scenario to undertake effective (and legal) efforts to reduce that
differential treatment in order to avoid liability.71
Social science in this scenario helps the law achieve its goals, but it
does so without intimacy with law (or legal actors), either through case-bycase determinations or administrative delineation of specific social sciencebased directives. Indeed, the “Just Friends” relationship between law and
social science on the doctrinal issue of employer responsibility opens up
opportunity for social science to have a richer and more intimate
relationship with employers, the entities being regulated by the law. Social
science under this scenario provides employers directly with guidance
about the best mechanisms for reducing discriminatory decisions given
their particular organizational goals, structures, and work conditions.
The law of course relies on social science here, but it uses social
science as (unembedded) social authority. It uses social science as
empirical grounding for the framework that imposes liability based on
evidence of differential treatment without undertaking a second doctrinal
68
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88
TEX. L. REV. 669, 674 (2010).
69
30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,320 (Sept. 28, 1965). A process-based “Just Friends” relationship can
easily become one of embedded social authority. The more that the agency or other legal actor is
involved in formulating the process and in doing so in relying on social science to determine the best
contours of process, the more embedded social science will become in the law.
70
See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 395, 444–47 (2011) (describing the role of statistics and social science testimony in modern
cases under systemic disparate treatment law established by the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977)). A relationship between social science and law also emerges at
this doctrinal point, regardless of the approach taken on employer liability. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text (noting the current debate over the use of social science testimony in employment
discrimination cases).
71
Quotas, for example, are not generally considered legal. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979) (finding a permissible affirmative action plan, but cautioning
against the use of quotas).
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inquiry to determine employer responsibility.
A similar relationship could be created through a more process-based
approach. This might involve the development of something like the
affirmative action requirement for federal contractors for all employers.72
The law (through the EEOC or some other regulatory body) under this
scenario would monitor organizations for compliance with processes
within which the organizations themselves would be expected to devise
mechanisms for reducing differential treatment within their specific
organizations. Focusing more closely on the question of employer liability
for widespread differential treatment, the EEOC might also decide which
organizations to target for Title VII violations under systemic disparate
treatment theory based both on whether differential treatment is
widespread within the organization and also on whether the organization
has a process in place for reducing differential treatment.
B. Expectations and Implications
The expectation for social science in the “Just Friends” scenario is one
of empirical grounding for the legal framework. The law in this scenario
expects that social science can show that organizations can do something
about their personnel structures, systems, and cultures to reduce differential
outcomes at a reasonable cost (at least in most cases), and that social
science and social scientists can guide organizations directly to do those
things, whether generally or specifically. Like with the first relationship,
this seems to be a realistic expectation given existing social science
research on biases and organizational behavior.73
Unlike with the other relationships identified in this Essay, the “Just
Friends” relationship might also expect social science to say something
about cost as groundwork for the legal framework. Given that structuring
workplaces, including adopting and implementing employment systems
and practices and shaping workplace cultures, is an ongoing process for
most organizations, an organization’s inclusion of equality and nondiscrimination as factors to consider in that process is unlikely to impose
That said, as with all legal frameworks or
substantial costs.74
72
For a brief description of the obligation imposed by Executive Order 11,246 and a review of
several studies of its effectiveness, see Faye J. Crosby & John F. Dovidio, Discrimination in America
and Legal Strategies for Reducing It, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM, supra note 51, at 23, 29–36.
73
See supra note 44 (citing studies showing scientific advances in identifying organizational
mechanisms for reducing discrimination).
74
Admittedly, research measuring the behavioral or financial costs of expanding business
concerns when structuring work or decision making or when shaping culture is sparse, at least beyond
the “business case for diversity.” See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Diversity as Strategy, 82 HARV. BUS.
REV. 98, 98–99 (2004) (describing IBM’s successful effort to make diversity a key corporate strategy
tied to real growth).
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interpretations that rest in part on beliefs about human and organizational
behavior (e.g., how biases work and how they and their influence on
decisions can best be reduced within organizations), if the research does
not bear out the empirical assumptions on which the legal framework sits,
the framework will need to rest more principally on other, sometimes more
normative footing, or be restructured.
In addition, the process-based variation of this relationship raises
concerns similar to those raised by the “Let’s Dance” option: We need
confidence that requiring process will lead to improved outcomes and not
just calcification of processes without meaningful change.75 This is of
particular concern given that the goals of regulated entities and the
government in the area of employment discrimination are not likely to be
as well aligned as in some other areas, such as worker safety, where a
process-based approach has been proposed.76
V. CONCLUSION
Thinking carefully about what the law of systemic discrimination
should look like around the question of employer responsibility for
widespread differential treatment within organizations requires attention to
the various ways in which the law might structure its relationship with
social science. More specifically, it requires attention both to the nature of
relationship being created (i.e., with whom social science will most
interact—administrative body or courts—and degree of intimacy) and the
precise expectations by the law for social science within that relationship.
I have organized this Essay around relationship types rather than
around legal approaches to the question of employer liability once
widespread differential treatment has been established. For those who
prefer organizing around legal approaches, I provide a chart below that
shows in the first column, the legal approach—how the law might create
the relationship—and in the second column, the relationship between law
and social science, using an icon to indicate my shorthand characterization
of the relationship types as well as the existing categorizing language for
law’s use of social science.

75
See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a
Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1300–04
(2012) (describing different contextualized regimes and identifying key theme of “continuous selfassessment”).
76
See Edward Rubin, Can the Obama Administration Renew American Regulatory Policy?, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 357, 379 (2011) (cautioning against ignoring differences in goals and goal-alignment
between government and organizations across contexts).
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CHART 1
DETERMINING ENTITY LIABILITY FOR
ESTABLISHED WIDESPREAD DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

Disparate Impact Law:
Job Related and Consistent with Business
Necessity/Alternative Employment Practice

Systemic Disparate Treatment Law:
Best Practices Defense

Systemic Disparate Treatment Law:
Conscientious Effort Defense
(or Negligence)

Embedded Social Fact

You Lead:
Embedded Social
Authority

I Lead:
Social Framework

Systemic Disparate Treatment Law:
Outcome-Based/No Defense
Social Authority

Systemic Disparate Treatment Law:
Process-Based Targeting (or Defense)
Social Authority
This chart may be helpful for summarizing some of the various
possible legal approaches to the specific doctrinal question of whether and
when employers should be held liable for established widespread
differential treatment and the type of relationship that is likely to emerge
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from each approach. However, it tells us nothing about the implications of
the relationships or the expectations that the law has for social science in
each of the relationships. These are the crucial considerations for judges,
legal scholars, and other legal actors to keep in mind as they shape the law
in this area.
It is important first that the law’s expectations of social science match
social science’s capabilities.
If social science cannot fulfill the
expectations that arise from a law-social science relationship, then the
relationship is likely to break down. The law in turn is likely to lose
legitimacy (from ill-footed frameworks and erroneous case-by-case
determinations) and efficacy (through bulletproofing and implementation
of ineffectual measures as best practices or processes).
Embeddedness, too, can be important to the inquiry of how best to
structure the law (and thereby the law’s relationship with social science).
While the established categories tend to focus on how social science is
being used and sometimes by which legal actor (i.e., administrative agency
or court), the variation of embeddedness sheds light on the degree of
intimacy between law and social science. In each of the embedded
relationships, law and social science must interact on a more regular basis
than they might otherwise do.
This is not to say that embedding social science in law will always be
the wrong choice. Whether embedding social science in law as social
authority makes sense depends in large part on whether social science can
meet the expectations placed upon it. Even if it can meet those
expectations, however, we should also consider how the relationship
between law and social science is likely to affect social science’s
relationship with others, particularly the entities being regulated, and how
it is likely to affect the law’s ability to monitor effectively. As between the
“Let’s Dance, You Lead” and “Let’s Dance, I Lead,” for example, research
discussed above suggests that it would likely be better to embed social
science in law as social authority than to merely invite it as social
framework on a case-by-case basis to guide application and development
of a loose legal standard.77
Related to this, it is also important to consider how the relationship
between law and social science is likely to affect both the law and social
science, including their “co-production.” This Essay has been admittedly
law-centric, focusing on understanding better how the shape of the law is
likely to affect the law’s relationship with social science at one doctrinal
point—entity responsibility for widespread differential treatment within an
organization—and the implications of that relationship for the efficacy of
77
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (stating that courts are more likely to defer to
organizations when the law is inexact).
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the law. But it ultimately signals caution for social scientists as well. The
relationship between law and social science seems to be developing
without attention to the long-term implications of the relationship being
created for not just law and its efficacy, but also for social science. An
intimate relationship with the law might not always be the best route for
helping the law achieve its goals, and it carries with it substantial risk that
the development of social science—the path of research and methods
used—will be skewed in negative ways.78
By putting the relationship between law and social science front and
center in thinking about the shape of the law, I do not mean to suggest that
the shape of the law will or should be determined solely by reference to
that relationship. Rather, the relationship created should be one, multifaceted consideration among others, including things like cost to the
judicial and other legal systems and, of course, the strength of our
normative commitment to reducing discrimination in the workplace.
Indeed, the same is true beyond the realm of employment discrimination.
As we learn more from social science about how humans operate in
context, judges, legislators, administrative actors, and legal scholars
working in areas from antitrust and securities law to environmental and
poverty law should think carefully about the law’s existing and emerging
relationships with social science.

78
Moreover, in many of the possible relationships, questions will arise about what counts as
social science. Routinized application of social science techniques by management consultants, for
example, even ones with disciplinary Ph.D.s, should raise concerns about standards and reliability
when relied upon by law to aide in making liability determinations.

